This article was first featured in the Insight newsletter.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ugbah v. Ugbah (2025) LPELR-81732(SC) is a significant reaffirmation of the Nigerian judiciary’s commitment to substantive justice. Delivered on 4 July 2025 by Abiru, JSC, the ruling revisits one of the most persistent debates in matrimonial litigation: whether a spouse can sue for maintenance and child welfare while a marriage is still intact, and whether such a claim must be commenced strictly by petition under the Matrimonial Causes Act.
What emerges from this decision is not merely a procedural clarification but a broader jurisprudential statement. The Court insists that justice in family relations must not be sacrificed on the altar of technical form. The case re-positions family law as a site of social responsibility and judicial compassion, reminding courts that procedural rigidity often perpetuates injustice, especially against women and children.
Facts in brief
Mrs. Veronica Ugbah filed an action before the High Court seeking maintenance for herself, educational support for her children, and funds for alternative accommodation from her husband, Mr. Patrick Ugbah. Her claim did not seek dissolution of the marriage. The husband challenged the competence of the action, arguing that the reliefs sought could only be pursued under the Matrimonial Causes Act by way of a petition for divorce or judicial separation. The trial court overruled him.
The Court of Appeal, however, struck out the case, reasoning that maintenance during a subsisting marriage could not be claimed by writ of summons. The Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the wife’s claim was competent and that procedural form must yield to the imperatives of justice.
The central issue: substance and the myth of procedural exclusivity
At the heart of Ugbah v. Ugbah lies the germane question about procedural exclusivity: must a claim for spousal maintenance or child welfare be tied to a petition for dissolution of marriage? The Supreme Court answered in the negative. Abiru, JSC, reasoned that the choice between a writ of summons and a matrimonial petition is one of convenience, not of jurisdiction. What the law requires, the Court held, is that the issues in controversy be properly brought before the court. Once the substance of the dispute – maintenance, welfare, education – is within the competence of the court to adjudicate, the mode of commencement cannot defeat justice.
This reasoning reflects an evolution from procedural formalism to purposive adjudication. It resonates with the dictum of Karibi-Whyte, JSC, in Olowu v. Olowu (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt.13) 372, where the Court stressed that “the administration of justice is not an exercise in technical craftsmanship but in the pursuit of
fairness”.
The welfare principle and independent rights of children
Beyond procedural form, the Supreme Court’s decision also affirms the autonomous rights of children to education, maintenance, and welfare. By recognising that such rights are enforceable even during a subsisting marriage, the Court aligned itself with the spirit of Section 17(3)(f) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which mandates the state to protect children against neglect and exploitation. In my view, the decision effectively drew from the welfare principle articulated in Williams v. Williams (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt.54) 66, where the Court of Appeal held that in all matters affecting children, their welfare must
be the paramount consideration. Ugbah extends that principle to the procedural sphere, holding that courts must be accessible to enforce welfare obligations, regardless of marital status.
Revisiting the role of the matrimonial causes act
The Supreme Court’s reasoning exposes a deep structural problem in Nigerian family law: the over-reliance on the Matrimonial Causes Act as a procedural straitjacket. Enacted in 1970, the Act was modelled on colonial-era English law that viewed maintenance and divorce as inseparable. However, social realities have changed. Many spouses, especially women, seek economic and emotional refuge through maintenance claims without wishing to dissolve their marriages. By allowing such claims to be brought by writ, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Matrimonial Causes Act cannot continue to monopolide the terrain of family justice.
This approach aligns with comparative jurisprudence. In Burns v. Burns (1984) Ch 317 (UK), the English Court of Appeal
recognised that equitable interests and financial entitlements may arise independently of formal matrimonial proceedings. The Nigerian apex court, perhaps unwittingly, has moved toward the same flexible model.
The rejection of technical fetishism
Justice Abiru’s rebuke of technicality echoes the Supreme Court’s long-standing view that procedural rules are handmaids, not mistresses, of justice. The reliance on Obakpolor v. State (1991) LPELR-2148(SC) reinforces this point. Akpata, JSC, had declared that the paramount duty of courts is to do justice, “not to cling to technicalities that defeat its ends”.
This philosophy traces back to Falobi v. Falobi (1976) 1NMLR169, where the Court held that the failure to cite the proper rule or statute should not defeat a claim if the court has jurisdiction and the substance is justiciable. Ugbah v. Ugbah thus belongs to a noble judicial tradition that prioritises justice over formal correctness.
Implications for Nigerian Family Law practice
The judgment has wide practical implications. First, it liberates family law practice from the procedural monopoly of the Matrimonial Causes Act. Practitioners can now file actions for maintenance or child welfare under the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Court. Second, it empowers vulnerable litigants, especially women and children, to seek redress without the stigma or social consequences of divorce. This widens access to justice and aligns with the guarantee of equality before the law of Sections 17(2)(a) and 42 (1) of the Constitution, 1999. Third, it invites courts to embrace procedural flexibility as a constitutional imperative. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ugbah mirrors the values of Sections 6(6)(b) and 36 of the Constitution, that ought to guide our courts. Beyond all of this, what distinguishes Ugbah v. Ugbah is not only its doctrinal innovation but its moral tone. It humanises the law of family relations. In recognising that the quest for maintenance is not necessarily a prelude to marital breakdown, the Court has restored dignity to the idea of mutual support within marriage. The decision also resonates with feminist jurisprudence that views procedural rigidity as a form of structural exclusion.
As the legal scholar, Professor Catharine MacKinnon, has consistently argued that the law’s claim to neutrality is often shaped by biases perpetuated by hierarchy and patriarchy. Ugbah is a quiet but significant repudiation of that neutrality in favour of substantive equality.
Conclusion: Toward a human-centred family jurisprudence
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ugbah v. Ugbah should be understood as a jurisprudential pivot. It signals a transition from a formalist to a human-centred model of family justice; one that privileges substance over form, compassion over rigidity, and access over technical exclusion.
In doing so, the Court has reaffirmed a simple but profound truth: the purpose of procedure is to serve justice, not to subvert it.
Where form and substance conflict, the duty of the court is clear: to let justice prevail, even if it must pierce the veil of technicality to do so.
For matrimonial practitioners, Ugbah v. Ugbah is both a guidepost and a reminder: that the practice of law, particularly family law, must remain sensitive to the lived realities of those whom the law is meant to protect.